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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

DARIUS WAYNE HAWS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 46225-2018 & 46226-2018
FREMONT COUNTY
NOS. CR-2016-1756 & CR-2017-285
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In these consolidated cases, Darius Wayne Haws appeals from the judgment entered in
CR-2016-1576, sentencing him to six years, with two years fixed, for delivery of a controlled
substance; from the judgment entered in CR-2017-285, sentencing him to a consecutive term of
three years, with one-year fixed for battery on an officer; and from the orders relinquishing
jurisdiction entered in both cases. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Haws asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing sentences that are excessive under the circumstances, and
by relinquishing jurisdiction over him.
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In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues, as a threshold matter, that Mr. Haws' appeal
should be dismissed based on the provision in a plea agreement waiving his right to appeal his
sentences.

(Resp.Br., p.3.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address that argument and to

demonstrate there is no valid waiver of the right to appeal the sentences, since the transcript of
the plea hearing confirms Mr. Haws' understanding that he was "reserving his right to appeal the
sentences that will come down later."
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing excessive sentences and by relinquishing
jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences And By
Relinquishing Jurisdiction

A.

The State Has Failed To Demonstrate A Valid Waiver Of Mr. Haws' Right To Appeal
His Sentences
The State's threshold argument is that Mr. Haws' appeal should be dismissed because he

"specifically waived his right to appeal his sentences when he entered into the plea agreements."
(Resp.Br., p.3.) This argument should be rejected.
"A waiver of a right to appeal contained in a plea agreement will be upheld if the record
shows the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Lee, 165 Iaho
254, 273 (2019); see also Idaho Criminal Rule ll(d)(3) (setting forth plea colloquy standards
and requiring the district court to ask the defendant about any known appellate waiver.) The
record in this case shows no such waiver.
While it is true that Mr. Haws had signed a plea agreement that contained a provision
waiving his right to appeal his sentences (see 46225 R., p.143; 46226 R., p.133), that waiver
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provision was not mentioned at the plea hearing, notwithstanding the exhaustive discussion
concerning all of the rights that Mr. Haws would be waiving (see generally Tr., p.8, L. 7 - p.36,
L.21). On the contrary, as shown by the plea hearing transcript, Mr. Hays did not understand
that by pleading guilty he would waive his appellate rights regarding his future sentences. The
district court asked:
COURT:

Do you understand that if you plead guilty, you're giving
up any and all other rights that you may have as a
defendant in a criminal case, including those that may not
have mentioned here in court today?

DEFENDANT:

Yes.

COURT:

Do you understand that if you plead guilty, you're giving
up all your defenses to this case and basically only
reserving your right to appeal the sentences that will come
down later?

DEFENDANT:

Yes.

(Tr., p.28, Ls.20-24.) (Emphasis added.)
Given this record, the State cannot demonstrate that a valid, enforceable appellate waiver
exists in this case.
B.

Even If The Appeal Waiver Were Valid, Dismissal Would Be Inappropriate Because
Mr. Haws' Appeal Of The Orders Relinquishing Jurisdiction Falls Outside That Waiver
Even if the appellate waiver provision was valid, dismissal of Mr. Haws' appeal would

inappropriate. The waiver provision, by its own terms, applies to the "conviction and sentence
imposed." (46225 R., p.143; R., p.133.) Mr. Haws' present appeal challenges the sentences
imposed, but also includes his appeal of the district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction.
(Appellant's Br., pp.3, 6-7.)

Mr. Haws' appeal of the orders relinquishing jurisdiction are

outside the scope of the waiver. Thus, even if the waiver provision is enforceable and bars
Mr. Haws' appeal ofhis sentences, that waiver does not bar his appeal of the orders relinquishing
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jurisdiction. If the written waiver provision is enforced, this Court may and should vacate the
district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction, as requested in Mr. Haws' Appellant's Brief
(Appellant's Br., pp.6-7.)
Regarding the State's arguments on the merits, such arguments are unremarkable and
Mr. Haws refers this Court to the arguments in his Appellant's Brief

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, and those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Haws respectfully
requests that in both of his cases, this Court vacate his sentences and the orders relinquishing
jurisdiction, and remand his cases to the district court with instructions that the court impose less
severe, reasonable sentences, and also that it retain jurisdiction and place him on probation.
DATED this 23 rd day of September, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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